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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E\VELL & SON, INC., a corporation,
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COlHPANY, a corporation,
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
PRELil\IINARY STATEMENT
Although the brief of respondent, Ewell & Son,
Inc., filed in this case raises no new legal issues, appellant Union Pacific Railroad Company deems it necessary to file this reply brief in order to reply to certain
assertions of fact made by respondent and in order to
1

prevent misunderstanding of Union Pacific's position
which might otherwise arise from misstatement of that
position in respondent's brief, as well as to correct misquotations of Union Pacific's brief made in respondent's
brief.

I. REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

At page 3 in respondent's brief it argues that the
testifying witnesses "presently or formerly employed by
the city ... would have no interest except to see justice
done between the parties." This statement is, of course,
manifestly absurd. Salt Lake City was and is a defendant in this case. Plaintiff's complaint ( R. 1-8) and plaintiff's amended complaint ( R. 37-47) reflect plaintiff's
consistent position up until the second day of the trial
that plaintiff was entitled to judgment against Salt Lake
City in the alternative if plaintiff was not given judgment against defendant railroads. From the time of
filing the complaint on February 15, 1966, until the
second
trial on May 13, 1970, a period encom- 1
passing
and one-half years, plaintiff maintained this position, and on the second day of the trial it
receded therefrom (R. 324-326). Clearly during this
period Salt Lake City's position as a defendant seeking
to place the burden of this lawsuit on the defendant
railroads was established and solidified. As a matter of '
fact, Mr. Crellin clearly stated that the position of the :
city was not that of an uninterested party. He candidly
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admitted to the trial court that "'Ve want to be of any
assistance that we can be in seeing that justice is occasioned here for the plaintiff in this matter." (Emphasis
added.) (R. 668) Salt Lake City officials throughout
the entire course of this proceeding were not interested
in seeing "justice done between the parties" but were
seeking only to vindicate a position which had been taken
by Commissioner Catmull, the City Engineer's office
and plaintiff, prior to any meeting between plaintiff,
the city and defendant railroads.

II. REPLY 'l'O STATElHENT O.F FACTS
Respondent's statement of fact contains many condusions drawn by respondent from evidence which was
in and of itself a conclusion and was erroneously admitted into evidence over the objection of defendant
railroads. For example, on page 7, in speaking of the
first meeting on October 21, 1965, respondent states, "At
the end of the meeting it was agreed that the contractor
would be contacted for the purpose of making an agreement between the railroads and the contractor. (R. 897)"
The basis of this statement is a conclusion drawn by Mr.
Holmgren, that "it was understood by all that they (the
railroads) were to contact the contractor." (R. 896)
Said conclusion was admitted over defendant's objection even though Mr. Holmgren stated, "I can't say who
said what." Union Pacific could cite many other similar
instances of conclusions made in the statement of facts
in respondent's brief, for it is replete with similar narra-
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tions of respondent's conclusions concerning statements
that were in themselves conclusions which were admitted
into evidence over Union Pacific's strenuous objections.
However, Union Pacific will allow the court to draw its
own conclusions concerning the facts of this lawsuit
from the record on appeal.

III.REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT I
In the last paragraph on page 14 and ending on the
top of page 15 of its brief, respondent states that the
Public Service Commission would have no interest in
the activity involved in this action because no hazard to, '
or interference with, rail or highway traffic was presented thereby. This statement is simply not true. Any
crossing of railroad tracks with any type of permanent
or temporary installation presents hazards, particularly
during the construction period, regardless of whether
such crossing is above, beneath, or at the same level with,
the tracks. And any dispute as to the duty to be imposed l
by law in respect to bearing the cost of alleviating such
hazards is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public ,
Service Commission. That is why the trial court erred in
giving Instruction No. 33, which not only overstated the
requirement of the franchise ordinances in evidence in
this case, but also stated that a duty was imposed by law
on defendant railroads in this action when such duty had
not been imposed by the Public Service Commission in
accordance with its exclusive jurisdiction to settle disputes in respect to such duty.
1
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I\'. REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II
The last paragraph of respondent's Point II, found
on page 20 of respondent's brief, misstates Union Pacific's contention, which contention respondent labels
·'careless and unfounded." Union Pacific's contention
in this case as expressed to the trial court and in its original brief to this court is that every public bidder to a
city project within the scope of the competitive bidding
statute is entitled to have detailed in writing all of the
material facts which might affect his bid in order that
each such bidder may stand on equal footing in preparing and submitting a bid on a public project. Union Pacific's only reference to "collusive" in its brief was in
designating one of the legislative purposes behind the
competitive bidding statute. As a matter of fact, Union
Pacific's counsel stated to the trial court in the course of
his motion for a directed verdict that he was not making
an accusation that favoritism was intended by the city
in this case but that to allow recovery in this case would
create the opportunity for such favoritism to be exercised. (R. 689) The statute was indeed intended to prerent the very type of activities admittedly conducted in
this case between Salt Lake City representatives and one
or two, but not all, of the potential bidders on this public project.

r.

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT III

None of the conduct of Union Pacific at the job site
11hich is contended by respondent to be a waiver of the
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right to disclaim formation of a contract with plaintiff
(p. 22 of respondent's brief) was in any way inconsistent
with the assumption by Union Pacific that plaintiff was
performing on its contract with the city to install a complete sewer. Defendant railroads by being present at the
job site were only performing their duty to the general
public to protect their right of way and railroad tracks
from unreasonable and unlawful interference. This conduct was certainly no more than is required of Union
Pacific, who is a public utility engaged in a public service with a public duty to protect its employees and the
persons it serves. Such public duty is at least as great as,
if not greater than, Salt Lake City's public duty to provide sewer service to its inhabitants. Under the facts and
cir.cumstances of this case Union Pacific was as a matter
of law clearly justified in assuming that plaintiff was
only doing its job pursuant to the contract it had with
Salt Lake City, and none of Union Pacific's conduct at
the job site in cooperating with respondent should be
held again.st it.
VI. REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IY
On page 26 of respondent's brief, in the last line of'
the first paragraph, respondent "blandly" misquotes
Union Pacific's brief by omitting the word "actual" from
between the words "of" and "authority," and in the argu·
ment that follows, respondent clearly fails to distinguish
between Union Pacific's contention in respect to actual
authority and the contentions of all parties in respect to
apparent authority. There is simply not a scintilla of
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evidence in this record that any representative of Union
Pacific who was in contact with plaintiff before, during
ur after construction had any actual authority to bind
Cnion Pacific to a contract as distinguished from apparent authority to so bind Union Pacific. All of the argument in respondent's brief is devoted to the question of
apparent authority, and the court was clearly in error in
failing to give defendant Union Pacific's Requested Instruction 4 ( R. 177) and in giving Instruction 28 ( R.
125) in place thereof.

VII. REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT VI
Respondent claims that the ample consideration for
its alleged contract with defendant railroads was that
plaintiff "guaranteed" not to interrupt railroad service
at each track for a period exceeding ten hours. This tenhour special time requirement appears to be somewhat
of an afterthought because even prior to the time when
plaintiff had any knowledge or idea that a time limitation might be requested, it asked for and received a
promise from Commissioner Catmull that defendant
railroads would pay any extra expense caused by the
presence of their tracks, and plaintiff received this promise prior to bidding on the contract. (R. 870, 876, 877)
The ten-hour time limitation was purely and simply a
standard which was determined by all parties to be reasonable dispatch in fulfillment of plaintiff's duty under
Paragraph 20 of its contract with Salt Lake City and
under Paragraphs I ( d) and I ( e) of the detailed specifications attached thereto.
7

On page 32 of respondent's brief, in the last sentence of Point VI, the question is asked why Ewell was
asked to give his open-cut price, if the railroads had no
responsibility to pay respondent. This question is easi!r
answered and was answered by Mr. Oatman (R. 7.,iz_
7 43) when he stated as follows:
"Q. Now, did you have some reason for asking
him what he was being paid by the City for laying this pipe in there'?

"A. Well, absolutely. The contract with the
City covered the trenching of the ground, the excavation and the material existing removal of
same by trucks and the replacement of excavation. There was some bedding involved under the
pipe backfill, road base and so forth. So, it appeared to me in my own thoughts that if we were
going to eliminate or the excavation possibly and
the backfill for whatever we decided, if we decided to jack under any track, there should be
some reimbursement from someone to the railroad company or railroad companies if they elected to jack or tunnel a piece of pipe under the railroad track, there should be a decrease in whatever
amount we'd have to pay for whoever this contractor might be to jack or tunnel a piece of pipe."

If Union Pacific had decided to bear the additional
expense of jacking the pipe under its tracks rather than
remove and replace them at its own expense, clearly it
should have been entitled to reimbursement by the city
for the savings to the city of not being obligated to pay
the contractor unit price rates for excavation, backfill,
bedding, road base, etc., for that work rendered unnec·
essary when pipe is installed by the jacking method.
8

From the railroad's viewpoint there was nothing unreasonable about The Rio Grande's inquiry concerning the
contractor's open-cut price to Salt Lake City nor did
such inquiry constitute the solicitation of an offer, as
implied by respondent's brief.
VIII.REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT VII
Respondent in Point VII again misconstrues appellant Union Pacific's contention, this time in respect to
double recovery.Union Pacific's contention on that point
is based on the fact that even if a contract as alleged by
plaintiff exists whereby Union Pacific is obligated to
pay for plaintiff's alleged extra cost at Union Pacific's
railroad tracks, any delay caused by the presence of said
railroad tracks and cables is included in the price of such
contract and to allow plaintiff damages both for the contract price and for delay is allowance of a double recovery. Instead of answering that contention, respondent on
pages 34 and 35 of its brief argues that its alleged contract price with the railroads is in addition to rather than
in lieu of, the prices provided for in the city's contract
with respondent.

IX. REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT X

e nion Pacific cannot determine from

respondent's
brief whether it is contending on page 39 that Union Pa(ific made some sort of waiver in connection with the rer1ueste<l instruction quoted in the brief. It is, however,
9

clear from the record that no such waiver was made.
Union Pacific, at the beginning of the trial in a motion
made to the court for involuntary dismissal ( R. 832836), in a renewal of that motion and in a motion for a
directed verdict made at the close of plaintiff's case (R.
684-690), in motions made at the close of all evidence
(R. 820-822) and in its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. 233-235), all supported by
memorandum and argument (for memorandum see R.
84-91, R. 211-230, R. 252-266) consistently maintained
the position that plaintiff was not able to and did not
prove express contract because plaintiff was bound by
the weakest portion of its own testimony. To imply that
Union Pacific somehow took an inconsistent position
with this position by attempting to formulate an instruction at the court's request relating to the general law of
contract is clearly without merit.
Union Pacific also asserts that the trial court in this
instance failed in its duty to instruct concerning the law
applicable to this lawsuit. Instead of giving one comprehensive set of instructions on the applicable law, it gave
what were in effect five sets of instructions-first, the
Union Pacific set, then the Rio Grande set, then plain·
tiffs set and the Salt Lake City set, and, finally, a few
standard instructions constituting the court set. Instruc·
tions relating to a particular subject were not in any
grouped, and the jury was imply allowed to choose between conflicting sets of instructions rather than being
directed to follow a comprehensive set which should hare
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been drafted by the trial court as part of its fundamental
duty, a duty which it failed to discharge in this case.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's brief, particularly when it misquotes and
misinterprets Union Pacific's contentions and position
in this matter, clearly demonstrates the reason why the
rule of law has been adopted by this court that an obligation arising from an express oral agreement or from
an implied contract will be imposed only with care and
in clear cases. When plaintiff's counsel, with a trained
legal mind, after having had an opportunity for more
than six months to analyze Union Pacific's brief, miseonstrues and misstates what was said by Union Pacific
therein in writing, is it any wonder that two parties who
meet for the first time and engage in oral conversation
may (and most assuredly did in this instance) misunderstand each other. An alleged oral contract based solely
upon what one party unilaterally "understood" cannot
be enforced, and in Union Pacific's opinion such unilateral understanding is the sum-total of all the evidence
tending to establish a contract in this lawsuit. All other
eYidence tending to prove the alleged formation of the
plaintiff's claimed contract with the railroads arises
through and from this unilateral "understanding" on the
part of plaintiff and the city. Like ships that pass in the
fog in the night, the minds of the plaintiff and the city,
on the one hand, and the minds of defendant railroads
on the other hand, passed by each other without ever
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colliding; and that the city and the plaintiff "understood"
a collision occurred, is simply not evidence thereof when
no one can remember the specific words nor the gist of
anything said by a specific representah\'e of either of
defendant railroads. For the reasons set forth in this
reply brief and in Union Pacific opening brief, Union
Pacific is entitled to the relief requested in this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
A. U. Miner
D. A. Bybee
N. W. Kettner
S. A. Goodsell
J.C. Williams
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
Union Pacific Railroad Company
600 Union Pacific Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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